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Abstract
We consider a domain as a particular system or a portion of the system, while
a scenario is a sequence of effects on the domain, originated by a particular
event or condition. We show how it is possible to build first the model of the
domain by replication and composition of atomic models, each representing a
particular aspect of the domain. Then, the models of the scenarios are
obtained from the domain’s model, by composing further atomic models
representing the events originating the scenarios. In particular, we take into
account the domain consisting of one control centre and a set of substations
inside an electrical distribution grid, communicating by means of a network.
We consider scenarios originated by threats such as the denial of service
attack to the communication network, and the temporary unavailability of
substations due to the failure and the repair of the internal components.
Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN) are the modelling formalism. The
simulation of the models representing the scenarios, estimates the impact of
the threats on the communication reliability.
1. Introduction
The CRUTIAL project (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL resilience) [1] has
investigated the ways to obtain the resilience of the Electrical Power System
(EPS); this means the capacity of the EPS to provide its service despite of the
occurrence of failures or attacks. For instance, an attack to a communication
network may affect the data exchange among the EPS sites connected by
that network, compromising an automation function depending on such data,
as in the case of the voltage regulation [2]. One of the activities in CRUTIAL is
the evaluation of the critical scenarios [2] consisting of particular event
sequences occurring in a specific portion of the EPS (scenario domain [3]), as
a consequence of an attack or a failure. One of the ways to estimate the
effects of such threats on the domain is the simulation of the stochastic
models of the scenarios.
In [4], we considered the domain consisting of a control centre and a set of
substations, connected by a communication network, inside a distribution grid
of the EPS, and we evaluated in reliability terms, scenarios characterized by
the communication network unavailability, and by intrusions generating fake
commands directed to the substations.
In this paper, we focus more on the modelling approach and we apply it in the
same domain (Sec. 2), to the scenarios where the communication is affected
by denial of service (DoS) attacks and failures of the substation components
(Sec. 5). According to the modelling approach, first we represent the domain
262
(Sec. 4) by replicating and composing Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) [5]
(Sec. 3) models, each representing a particular aspect of the domain. Then,
the scenarios are represented (Sec. 6) by composing the domain model with
further SAN models, each concerning a certain threat. The resulting models
are simulated (Sec. 7) in order to estimate the communication reliability in
terms of probability and quantity of failed communication sessions. The
design, the replication, the composition and the simulation of the SAN models
are supported by the tool Möbius [6].
2. Domain specification
The scenarios under exam take place in a domain composed by one control
centre, a set of 10 substations, and 2 redundant communication networks
(Fig. 1), located in a distribution grid of the EPS. Substations execute the
commands coming from the control centre and concerning the electrical lines
connected to the substations. An example of command is the arming or
disarming order [2]. The generation of a command may occur as a
consequence of the state of the electrical lines, described by the signals
transmitted from the substations to the control centre. Such information allows
the control centre to monitor and rule the distribution grid under its control. So,
the communication of commands and signals has to be reliable in order to
avoid malfunctioning.
Figure 1. The scheme of the domain (and the threats (Sec. 5))
2.1 Communication sessions
In our domain, we suppose that each command generated by the control
centre has to be executed by all the substations; therefore, a copy of the
command is sent to each substation. Moreover, we assume that the execution
of a command by a substation is notified to the control centre by the
transmission of an acknowledgment coming from the substation. The following
sequence of operations is called “command session”:
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1. the control centre opens the command session: it generates the command
and starts collecting the acknowledgments coming from the substations and
concerning the command execution, until a certain time out expires;
2. a copy of the command is transmitted on the available communication
network to each substation;
3. each substation executes the command and generates an acknowledgment
proving the execution of the command;
4. each acknowledgment is transmitted on the available communication
network to the control centre;
5. the time out for the acknowledgments collection expires and the command
session is closed.
We suppose that signals are not sent by a substation in an autonomous way,
but we assume that they are generated as a reply to a poll request:
periodically the control centre polls all the substations by sending a poll
request to each of them, and they reply by sending a signal to the control
centre. A “signal session” consists of the following sequence of operations:
1. the control centre opens the signals session: it generates a poll and starts
collecting signals coming from the substations, until a certain time out expires;
2. a poll request is transmitted on the available communication network to
each substation;
3. each substation generates the signal;
4. each signal is transmitted on the available communication network to the
control centre;
5. the time out for the signals collection expires and the signal session is
closed.
We assume that at most one command (signal) session is running at any
time. In the domain under study (and in the scenarios (Sec. 5)), the time for an
event to occur can be deterministic or random; in the second case, such time
is ruled by the negative exponential distribution. The occurrence (mean) times
for the events in a command or signal session are reported in Tab. 1.
Event Type of event (mean) time to occur occurring rate
command generation stochastic 6.00000E+0 h 0.16667 1/h
command execution stochastic 2.77778E-4 h 3600 1/h
time out for ack. deterministic 5.55555E-3 h -
poll generation deterministic 8.33333E-2 h -
signal generation stochastic 2.77778E-4 h 3600 1/h
time out for signals deterministic 5.55555E-3 h -
packet transmission stochastic 2.77778E-4 h 3600 1/h
Table 1. The (mean) occurrence time (and rates) for the events in a session
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2.2 Transmission of packets
In our domain, the transmission of the several kinds of packets (command
copies, acknowledgments, poll requests and signals) is performed by means
of the redundant communication networks NET1 and NET2. NET1 is usually
used for the communication between the control centre and the substations.
We suppose that the bandwidth of each communication network is equal to 16
Kbit/sec and that the transmission of each packet consumes 1 Kbit/sec of the
bandwidth. This means that no more than 16 packets can be transmitted on
the same communication network at the same time. It may happen that the
current available bandwidth of NET1 is not enough to transmit all the packets.
For instance, if a command session and a signal session are running in
parallel way, it may happen that 10 acknowledgments and 10 signals have to
be transmitted to the control centre at the same time. In this case, 16 of such
packets will be transmitted by NET1, while the remaining 4 packets will be
directed to NET2 for the transmission.
Actually, we could have specified that the transmission of a packet requires
less than 1 Kbit/sec of the bandwidth, or that a communication network has a
bandwidth higher than 16 Kbit/sec; in this way, the communication network
would be able to transmit more than 16 packets at the same time. Our choice
depends on the fact that one of the goals of the scenarios is evaluating the
effect of the bandwidth consumption, on the communication reliability. To this
aim, if the communication networks had a higher transmission capacity, then
we would need to consider more than 10 substations in the case study,
possibly making the simulation computing cost worse.
3. SAN formalism
SAN can be considered as a particular form of Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [7];
so, a SAN model contains places (appearing as circles), activities (appearing
as bars) and arcs. A place contains a certain number of tokens (marking). An
instantaneous activity (transition) completes (fires) as soon as it is enabled; a
timed activity instead, completes after a certain amount of time which can be
random or deterministic. A particular condition on the marking of a certain set
of places enables the completion (firing) of activities whose effect is modifying
in some way the marking of the places. Such condition and effect can be
expressed by connecting the activity to the places by means of oriented arcs,
as it is possible in SPN. Another way consists of using input gates. An input
gate is connected to an activity and to a set of places, and is characterized by
two expressions:
• a predicate consists of a Boolean condition expressed in terms of the
marking of the places connected to the gate; if such condition holds, then the
activity connected to the gate is enabled to complete.
• a function expresses the effect of the activity completion on the marking of
the places connected to the gate.
A SAN model can contain output gates as well. An output gate has to be
connected to a certain activity and to a set of places. Its role is specifying only
the effect of the activity completion, so it is characterized only by a function.
Gates graphically appear as triangles (input gate: ◄ - output gate: ►).
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The Replicate/Join formalism [5] was conceived for SAN models and
expresses by means of a tree structure, the way to compose together several
SAN models in a unique large composed model: leaf nodes are atomic SAN
models, each non leaf node is a Join or Replicate operator, and the root node
is the resulting model. In particular, the Join operator composes two or more
SAN models sharing places. The Replicate operator constructs a model
consisting of a number of identical copies of a certain SAN model (copies can
share places).
3.1 Motivating the use of SAN
As Petri Net based formalisms in general, SAN expresses the system states
and behaviour in terms of places containing tokens, and transitions modifying
their quantity. So, the system dynamics is represented by the token game,
avoiding the modeller to enumerate the complete state space of the system.
This is useful in particular when the system behaviour is characterized by the
occurrence of concurrent events. Deterministic and random completion times
are available in SAN. This is a reason why SAN is suitable to model the
domain and the scenarios in this paper, where both stochastic and
deterministic events occur.
Another advantage of SAN is the presence of gates which allow to set
complex firing conditions or effects that would be very complicated (or
impossible) to express in a SPN, only by means of oriented arcs. This
simplifies the graph structure of the model when we represent complex
systems. Moreover, the modeller can concentrate its attention on each
particular aspect of the system behaviour and represent it in form of SAN;
then, the SAN models can be easily composed in order to obtain the model of
the whole system.
4. Building the model of the domain
In our modelling approach, we first model in form of SAN, each aspect of the
domain, in isolation. Then, the SAN models are replicated and joined in order
to obtain the model of the whole domain. Actually several places are shared
by the SAN models and they act as points of connection when the models are
composed. For the sake of brevity, in this section we briefly describe the SAN
models of the domain aspects, while all their details can be found in [8].
The functions of the control centre (Sec. 2.1) are represented by the SAN
model appearing in Fig. 2 where the upper part concerns the command
generation and the collection of acknowledgments, while the lower part is
about the poll generation and the collection of signals. The functions
performed by a substation are modelled in the SAN model in Fig. 3: the upper
part of the model is about the execution of commands and the generation of
acknowledgments, while the lower part concerns the generation of signals.
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Figure 2. The atomic model of the control centre functions
Figure 3. The atomic model of the substation functions
The transmission of packets can be performed by the communication network
NET1 or by NET2 (Sec. 2.2); packets can be command copies,
acknowledgments, poll requests or signals. The SAN model in Fig. 4
represents this situation. The markings of several places in this model
represent packets waiting to be transmitted on the available communication
network: the tokens inside the places com_queue and poll_queue represent
command copies and poll requests respectively, and they appear also in the
SAN model of the control centre (Fig. 2); the tokens inside the places
ack_queue and sig_queue represent acknowledgments and signals
respectively, and they appear also in the SAN model of the substation
functions in Fig. 3. Other places in the SAN model in Fig. 4 represent instead
packets that have been delivered: the markings of the places ack and sig
represent the acknowledgments and the signals respectively, delivered to the
control centre; such places appear in the SAN model of the control centre
(Fig. 2) as well. The tokens inside the places com and poll represent the
command copies and the poll requests respectively, delivered to the
substations; therefore these places belong also to the SAN model of the
substation functions (Fig. 3).
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Figure 4. The atomic model of the packets transmission
Besides representing the packets transmission, the SAN model in Fig. 4 acts
as a “bridge” to join the previous SAN models in order to build the model of
the whole domain. This is done in Fig. 5 where the SAN model of the
substation is replicated 10 times by means of the Rep operator (Sec. 3), in
order to represent the presence of 10 substations in the domain (Sec. 2.1).
The result of the replication is joined with the SAN model of the control centre
(Fig. 2) and with the SAN model of the packets transmission (Fig. 4) according
to the common places mentioned above. This is done by means of the Join
operator (Sec. 3) and generates the model of the domain.
Figure 5. The composed model of the domain
5. Scenarios specification
In absence of attacks or failures, the communication between the control
centre and the substations cannot fail. In case of threats instead, some
packets (command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals) may be
lost. If the number of substations is N, we consider a command (signal)
session as successful if at least N −1 acknowledgments (signals) are received
by the control centre before that the time out expires (N = 10 in the domain
under study). In other words, if more than one acknowledgment (signal) is
missing when the time out expires, then the command (signal) session is
considered to be failed.
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As mentioned in Sec. 1, each scenario is characterized by the occurrence of a
particular kind of attack or failure, and in this paper we are interested in
evaluating three scenarios:
• Scenario 1: the DoS attacks may occur;
• Scenario 2: the substations failures may occur;
• Scenario 3: both the substations failures and the DoS attacks may occur.
5.1 DoS attack
During a DoS attack, the attacker sends a huge amount of packets on the
affected communication network: the effect is the gradual reduction of the
bandwidth available for normal communication, leading to the complete
unavailability of the bandwidth. We assume that a DoS attack may affect
NET1 or NET2 (Fig. 1). Both communication networks may be attacked
several times, but a communication network cannot be the object of more than
one attack at the same time. It may happen that both networks are under
attack at the same time, but in this case, two distinct attacks are running and
each affects one communication network.
Event mean time to occur occurring rate
DoS occurrence 720 h 0.00139 1/h
DoS duration 12 h 0.08333 1/h
Bandwidth reduction by 1 Kbit/sec 0.1875 h 5.33333 1/h
Table 2. The occurrence mean times and rates of the events in the DoS attack
NET1 and NET2 are redundant; so, in case of NET1 under attack, its
bandwidth is gradually consumed by the packets transmitted by the attacker;
therefore also NET2 has to be exploited to transmit. If the global available
bandwidth of both NET1 and NET2 is not enough to transmit all the packets,
some of them will not be transmitted becoming lost.
We suppose that the mean time to completely consume the bandwidth of
NET1 is 3 h: since the bandwidth of NET1 and NET2 is 16 Kbit/sec
respectively, then the bandwidth occupancy by the DoS attack is increased by
1 Kbit/sec every 675 sec. (Tab. 2). When the DoS attack ends, the bandwidth
consumed by the attack becomes available again for the normal
communication.
5.2 Substation failure
We assume that a substation is composed by three subsystems (Fig. 1):
• the MCDTU (Monitoring Control and Defence Terminal Unit) [2] is the core of
the substation and consists of a particular device in charge of managing the
requests for command execution or for signal generation. The MCDTU is
connected to both the substation LAN and to the substation bay.
• The LAN (Local Area Network) acts as a bridge between the MCDTU and
the external communication networks NET1 and NET2: all the packets
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transferred from NET1 or NET2 to the LAN, then to the MCDTU (commands
and polls), or in the opposite sense (acknowledgments and signals), are
directed by a router and filtered by a firewall.
• The bay contains all the electrical devices necessary to physically perform
the commands received by the MCDTU, and to generate the signals. We
assume that the bay contains three redundant IED (Intelligent Electronic
Device) [2] components connected to the MCDTU by means of two redundant
electrical buses: the MCDTU controls the IEDs ordering them the execution of
the commands or the retrieval of signals.
Component MTTF Failure Rate MTTR Repair Rate
bus 4380 h 2.28311E-4 1/h 24 h 4.16667E-2 1/h
IED 4380 h 2.28311E-4 1/h 48 h 2.08333E-2 1/h
MCDTU 8760 h 1.14155E-4 1/h 12 h 8.33333E-2 1/h
router 17520 h 5.70776E-5 1/h 6 h 1.66667E-2 1/h
firewall 17520 h 5.70776E-5 1/h 6 h 1.66667E-2 1/h
Table 3. The mean time to failure, the failure rate, the mean time to repair,
and the repair rate for each of the substation components
The failure mode of the substation is expressed by the Fault Tree (FT) [7] in
Fig. 6. A substation cannot execute commands or generate signals while it is
unavailable because of its internal failure. We assume that all the substation
components are repairable, so the substation can be available again. We
suppose that each repair process acts on a single component, and such
processes can be executed in parallel way. The mean time to failure, the
mean time to repair and the corresponding rates are reported in Tab. 3.
Actually we do not resort to the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [7] in the scenarios
evaluation. The FT model is exploited only as a graphical representation of
the failure mode of the substation, and in Sec. 6, it will be converted in SAN
form.
Figure 6. The Fault Tree model of the substation failure mode
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6. Building the models of the scenarios
The model of a scenario is obtained by representing the threat characterizing
the scenario in form of SAN, and joining it with the model of the domain, still
exploiting the common places.
The Scenario 1 is characterized by the occurrence of DoS attacks (Sec. 5.1).
A single DoS attack is modelled by the SAN in Fig. 7; it contains the place
dos_out modelling the occupancy of the bandwidth by the packets transmitted
by the DoS attack. Since this may affect NET1 or NET2, two instances of the
DoS attack model are composed with the model of the domain in order to
obtain the model of the Scenario 1 (Fig. 8): one instance represents the DoS
attack to NET1, so its place dos_out corresponds to the place dos_out_1 in
the SAN model of the packets transmission (Fig. 4). The other instance
concerns the attack to NET2; therefore its place dos_out corresponds to the
place dos_out_2 of the packets transmission model. In this way, the model in
Fig. 4 takes into account the bandwidth consumption also by means of the
DoS packets, and acts as a bridge also to include the DoS attack in the
scenario model.
Figure 7. The atomic SAN model of the DoS attack
Figure 8. The composed model of the Scenario 1
In the Scenario 2, the communication may be compromised by the
unavailability of the substations (Sec. 5.2). The SAN model in Fig. 9 consists
of the conversion into SAN, of the FT model in Fig. 6, with the addition of the
repair processes, each involving a single component. In particular, this SAN
model contains the place substation_ko indicating if the substation is currently
unavailable or not. The composed model of the Scenario 2 in Fig. 10 is
derived from the domain model (Fig. 5) in this way: before the replication, the
SAN model of the substation functions (Fig. 3) is joined with the SAN model of
the substation failure and repair (Fig. 9), by means of the common place
substation_ko. In this way, in the resulting model of the substation, its
functions are disabled if such place is marked (the substation is unavailable).
Then, such model is replicated in order to represent the set of 10 substations
in the domain.
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Finally, the Scenario 3 takes into account both the DoS attacks and the
substations failures. So, its composed model (Fig. 11) is obtained from the
model of the domain by including two instances of the DoS attack SAN model,
and the SAN of the substation failure and repair. The details about the atomic
SAN model in Fig. 7 and in Fig. 9 are available in [8].
Figure 9. The atomic model of the failure and the repair of the substation
7. Simulating the scenarios
For each scenario model described in the previous section, 10000 simulation
batches have been performed by means of the tool Möbius, setting a
confidence level of 0.95, and a relative confidence interval of 0.1. The
measures computed by the simulation are:
• Pr_com(t): the probability that at least one command session has failed at a
certain time;
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• Pr_sig(t): the probability that at least one signal session has failed at a
certain time;
• Num_com(t): mean number of failed command sessions at a certain time;
• Num_sig(t): mean number of failed signal sessions at a certain time.
Figure 10. The composed model of the Scenario 2
Figure 11. The composed model of the Scenario 3
The functions expressing such measures in terms of place markings are
reported in [8]. All measures are computed for a mission time t varying
between 0 and 10000 h. The values of Pr_com(t) and Pr_Sig(t) returned by
the simulation in each scenario are depicted in Fig. 12 where we notice that
the DoS attacks (Scenario 1) determine an higher probability of command or
signal session failure, with respect to the substation failures (Scenario 2). This
is confirmed in terms of number of failed sessions, by the results obtained for
the measures Num_com(t) and Num_sig(t), as shown in Fig. 13. The
simulation results in numerical form are available in [8] where they are
commented with more detail.
Figure 12. a) Pr_com(t) b) Pr_sig(t)
In the CRUTIAL project, the results of the models simulation have been
compared with the results of test-beds execution on prototypal power system
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management architectures. The evaluation of scenarios both in form of
models and in form of test-beds, has supported and inspired the definition of
architectures resilient to attacks and failures. The achievements of the project
are reported in [9].
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on the modelling approach to represent domains
and their critical scenarios. In particular, we dealt with the domain consisting
of the control centre and the substations in a distribution grid of the EPS.
According to the modelling approach, the composed SAN model of the
domain has been built by applying the Join and Replicator operators to the
atomic SAN models dedicated to the control centre, the substation, and the
communication network, respectively. Then, the models of the scenarios have
been obtained by extending the domain composed model, with the atomic
models representing the DoS attack and the substation failure respectively.
The reliability of the communication in each scenario has been evaluated in
terms of probability and quantity of command or signal session failures, by
simulating the corresponding SAN model, by means of Möbius.
Figure 13. a) Num_com(t) b) Num_sig(t)
Modelling only the failure mode of the system, as we do in FTA, is not enough
to evaluate the communication reliability in the scenarios: actually we had to
concentrate our attention first on the model of the normal functioning of the
system (domain model), and then to the occurrence of threats with their effect
on the system functioning (scenario model). The possibility of replicating and
composing atomic models simplified this task. The domain model can be
useful for performance evaluation, while the scenario model is effectively
oriented to estimate the reliability. If we had to model other scenarios in the
same domain, we would have to create only the models of the new threats,
and combine them with the existing model of the domain, as we did in [4]
(Sec. 1).
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